The Oxford Handbook of International Security (Oxford Handbooks of International Relations) by Alexandra Gheciu & William C. Wohlforth

Author:Alexandra Gheciu & William C. Wohlforth
Language: eng
Format: epub, azw3
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Published: 2018-03-07T23:00:00+00:00

NOTES

1.The regime also includes the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Additional Protocol, and nuclear-weapon-free zones, among others. The IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council act as enforcement mechanisms on safeguard agreements. For a comprehensive analysis of this regime, see Wan (2013) and Wan and Solingen (2017).

2.Betts (2000: 69) argued that one should be able to name at least one specific country that would have sought nuclear weapons or tested them, but refrained from doing so because of the NPT. He found none that come to mind. Egypt’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs Nabil Fahmy argued that very few non-nuclear weapons states joined the treaty because it responded to their immediate security concerns and that most did so for political or economic reasons and had otherwise no reason to pursue nuclear weapons (Carnegie Endowment Conference 2006).

3.Schelling (1976: 80) himself made clear that “the most severe inhibitions are undoubtedly those on the actual use of nuclear weapons, not on the possession of them.”

4.According to Mueller and Schmidt (2010) 36 states are known to have once started nuclear weapons activities.

5.On “myth-making” and nuclear weapons, see Lavoy (1993).

6.The more inward-looking the target, the less effective are coercion and positive inducements (Solingen 2012). See also Miller (2014).

7.Pierre Gallois, Herman Khan, and Nixon himself were among them. A 1957 National Intelligence Estimate advanced that Japan was highly likely to go nuclear within a decade <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/>. Kissinger argued that “We must have no illusion: Failure to resolve the North Korean nuclear threat in a clear-cut way will sooner or later lead to the nuclear armament of Japan—regardless of assurances each side offers the other” (Kissinger 2003).

8.All references to Makoto in Endicott (1975: 63).

9.http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/opinion/the-trump-effect-on-tokyo.html? ref=world.

10.Following North Korea’s launching of nuclear-capable missiles unto Japan’s exclusive economic zone in 2016, defense minister Inada Tomomi discounted Japan’s consideration of nuclear weapons “at the moment” while declaring that Japan’s constitution has “no restrictions on the types of weapons that Japan can possess as the minimum necessary.” Premier Abe immediately added that “there is no way that Japan will either possess nuclear weapons or consider possessing such arms” <https://nuclear-news.net/2016/08/07/abe-rules-out-possibility-that-japan-will-possess-nuclear-weapons/>. Nearly 60 percent of polled South Koreans arguably supported an indigenous nuclear deterrent in 2016 but the government restated its non-nuclear course <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/09/205_214598.html.

11.On how non-falsifiable predictions undermine the quality of professional discourse and our ability to improve policy, see Tetlock and Scoblic (2015).

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